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RECENT DECISIONS
ciable as intangible assets.' Only when the courts adopt this rationale will
they reach results which will conform to the Internal Revenue Code and
to economic reality.
HARRY A. HAINES
SCIENTER REQUIRED IN POST OFFICE CENSORSHIP PROCEEDING UNDER
I8 U.S.C. § 1461.-Three publishing corporations, having a common presi-
dent, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia to enjoin a nonmailability order of the Postmaster General of the
United States against certain of their magazines. The magazines, entitled
MANual, Trim, and Grecian Guild Pictorial, consist of photographs of nude
or semi-nude males, and advertisements by independent photographers of-
fering photographs of male nudes for sale. The District Court denied in-
junctive relief and sustained nonmailability on the grounds that the maga-
zines are obscene in themselves and that they contain information of where
obscenity may be obtained. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.1  On
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. Mr.
Justice Harlan, in announcing the judgment of the court, was of the view
that the magazines do not affront the current community standards of de-
cency and, hence, are not obsene in themselves. Secondly, without a showing
of scienter on the part of the publisher the magazines cannot be removed
from the mails on the grounds that they contain information of where ob-
scenity may be obtained. Mr. Justice Stewart concurred. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the re-
versal, but based their opinion on the ground that the Postmaster General
has no legal authority to make nonmailability determinations under 18
U.S.C. § 1461 (1955). (Mr. Justice Black concurred in the result writing
no opinion, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice White took no
part in the decision. Mr. Justice Clark dissented against both of the
separate majority opinions on the ground that the Postmaster General has
authority to make nonmailability determinations under 18 U.S.C. § 1461
(1955), and further, that scienter is an immaterial element. Manual Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Day, 82 Sup. Ct. 1432 (1962).
The divergence of opinion among the justices makes it difficult to in-
terpret the impact of the decision. Although the concept of a prior re-
straint seems crucial, it is not explicity considered in any of the opinions.
What can the Court be expected to do regarding future Post Office De-
"Although all leases theoretically constitute depreciable assets, only the favorable
lease could be depreciated because the rents received from it are greater than could
currently be obtained on the same property. This excess value would exhaust it-
self whereas in the unfavorable and ordinary lease situations there would be no
excess value to depreciate. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960): "Intangibles. If an
intangible asset is known from experience or other facts to be of use in the busi-
ness or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which
can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the
subject of a depreciation allowance." Compare Comm'r v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265,
274, 276 (9th Cir. 1953).
'Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 289 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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partment conduct? With the support of Mr. Justice Clark, the Post Office
Department may have a reasonable chance to succeed by conducting its
proceedings in accordance with the opinion of Justices Harlan and Stewart.
The failure of this opinion to analyze the issues in terms of a prior restraint
will trouble the Court in future decisions.
Obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, which guarantees freedom of speech and press.!
However, the courts have been plagued by two problems in obscenity cases:
what is obscenity, and how may it be regulated.
The various forms of regulation of obscenity may be loosely classified
as prior restraint and subsequent punishment. The former involves cen-
sorship before the obscene material has been disseminated; the latter usual-
ly involves criminal punishment after the obscene material has been dis-
seminated.
The legal authority claimed for the nonmailability order of the Post
Office Department in the instant case is 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1955).' This
section is a general criminal statute prescribing criminal responsibility for
the sending of obscenity or information of where it may be obtained through
the mails. But, as used by the Post Office Department,' it is an effective
prior restraint utilized to remove from the mails material that is deemed
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
This statute provides that: "Every obscene . . . article, matter, thing, device, or
substance; and ...
"Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement,
or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where or how, or
from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles, or things
may be obtained or made....
"Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails
or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
"Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing . . .of anything declared
by this section to be nonmailable, ... shall be fined not more than $5,000.00 or Im-
prisoned not more than five years,...."
'The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas discusses the general issue of the authority of the Post Office Depart-
ment to act under § 1461. Four questions are involved in this general issue: (1)
whether Congress can close the mails to obscenity by any means other than
prosecution of its sender; (2) if Congress can authorize exclusion of mail, can it
provide that obscenity be determined in the first instance in any forum except
a court; (3) if Congress can authorize such censorship, has it conferred such pow-
er on the postal officials; and (4) assuming affirmative answers to the first three
questions, are the procedures employed by the Post Office Department valid? The
concurring justices confine their opinion to question (3), and conclude that Con-
gress has not conferred on the Post Office Department the power to censor under
§ 1461. They review discussions in the Senate and House of Representatives in
connection with the passage of § 1461 and amendments thereto. The chief argu-
ment is that it is questionable whether the authority has been extended to the Post
Office Department, especially in view of the fact that other statutes authorizing
the Post Office Department to withhold matter from the mails expressly so provide
and make unambiguous reference to postal laws. An example is 18 U.S.C. § 1463
(1955), which provides that the listed items, ". . . shall be withdrawn from the
mails under such regulations as the Postmaster General shall prescribe." (Em-
phasis added.)
GAlthough the restraint involved here is exercised after the magazine is published
it is a prior restraint. Some years ago a prior restraint only petained to sup-
pession of publication and not to circumvention of its dissemination. Today, how-
ever, denial of transportation of material through the mails is considered an ef-
fective prior restraint. Comment, 27 U. Cnx. L. REv. 354 (1960).
[Vol. 24,
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 24 [1962], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol24/iss1/5
RECENT DECISIONS
to be obscene or that gives information of where obscenity may be ob-
tained.
Because of the repugnance of preventing communication, the Supreme
Court in Near v. Minnesota held that prior restraints are void' with cer-
tain exceptions. Obscenity was one such exception, and is, therefore, a
proper subject for prior restraint.
The contention of the Post Office Department that the magazines in
the instant case were obscene in themselves was not sustained by Justices
Harlan and Stewart because the magazines ". . . cannot be deemed so of-
fensive on their face as to affront current community standards of de-
cency ..... ' Their position on this aspect of the case is more understand-
able than their position on the claim that the magazines give information
of where obscenity may be obtained.
'The Post Office Department also exercises censorship under the "mail-block"
statute. 39 U.S.C. §§ 4006, 4007 (1962). This statute authorizes the Postmaster
General to stop all mail addressed to a sender of obscenity and mark it "Unlaw-
ful" and return it. The Postmaster General may apply to a federal district court
for an injunction. Pursuant to YEn. R. Civ. P. 56, on a showing of probable cause
he may obtain a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction directing
an impounding of mail addressed to a sender of obscenity pending statutory pro-
ceedings.
The Post Office Department may also proceed to revoke a sender's second-class
mail rate pursuant to 39 U.S.C.A. § 4354 (1962).
'283 U.S. 697 (1931). Prior restraint has been declared void in Montana under
MONT. CONST. art. III, § 10. See, Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Fed'n of Labor, 37
Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127 (1908).8
"'Prior restraint is a method of censorship which should be closely guarded against,
because it is insiduous in its nature, and complete in its operation. A communica-
tion that is censored never reaches the public at all, or it may be withheld so long
that its value is lost. A system of prior restraint leaves no opportunity for public
appraisal or criticism, and this increases the chances of official discrimination and
abuse. The decision to prohibit is made administratively and the opportunity forjudicial review is slight." Note, Prior Rcstraint-The Constitutional Question, 42
B.U.L. REv. 357, 364 (1962).
gInstant case at 1434. The test for obscenity is: "Whether to the average persons,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." United States v. Roth, 354 U.S.
476, 489 (1957). In the instant case Justices Harlan and Stewart state: "Obscenity
under the federal statute . . . requires proof of two distinct elements: (1) patent
offensiveness; and (2) 'prurient interest appeal.' Both must conjoin before chal-
lenged material can be found 'obscene' under § 1461." Instant case at 1436.
The two justices agree that the magazines are, ". . . dismally unpleasant, un-
couth, and tawdry." But they conclude that the magazines do not affront the
current community standards of decency and are not, therefore, "patently offensive."
The element of "prurient interest" is considered in the opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court as an issue that need not be decided in the instant case. The
opinion indicates that the problem lies in the fact that homosexuals are not average
persons and that material which would stimulate them may have no effect at all
upon the average member of the community; hence, the material is not within
the test for obscenity as set forth in the Roth case, supra.
i'OThe magazines display nude or semi-nude male models in highly suggestive poses.
The entire publication is designed to stimulate homosexual tendencies. The genitals
were covered in all instances so that technically there Is simply a portrayal of semi-
nude men. Mr. Justice Harlan states: ". . . (T)hese portrayals of the male nude
cannot fairly be regarded as more objectionable than many portrayals of the
female nude that society tolerates. Of course not every portrayal of male or female
nudity is obscene." Instant case at 1438. Accord, Parmelee v. United States, 113
F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957) ; Sunshine
Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958).
Until psychological studies become a part of the test for obscenity, the Court
has little opportunity to look at the challenged material subjectively. For this
reason the decision of Justices Harlan and Stewart as regards obscenity per se is
at least understandable.
1962]
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This is the first time that the Supreme Court has considered a non-
mailability order based on the advertising proscription of § 1461. Removal
of material from the mails has been attempted in situations where the ad-
vertiser was not offering obscenity and the advertisements were more in
the nature of fraud as giving the "leer" that obscenity would be sent in
response to the advertisements. The nonmailability determinations have
not been sustained in such cases.'
In the instant case, the advertisers were admittedly sources of ob-
scenity.' The Post Office Department was proceeding against many of
them, and some had been convicted for possession and distribution of ob-
scenity. However, Justices Harlan and Stewart denied proscription of the
magazines because it was not shown that the publisher knew his advertisers
were offering obscene matter.
In requiring scienter the two Justices relied solely on Smith v. Califor-
nia.' In the Smith case, scienter was made a necessary element in order
to sustain the constitutionality of an ordinance making a bookseller crim-
inally responsible for the possession of obscene books. The lower courts
had sustained the statute as imposing absolute criminal liability for the
offense. The Supreme Court required the element of scienter, not to pro-
vide a mens rea as a prerequisite to criminal liability, but to protect the
First Amendment rights of the public. Unless it was made necessary to
show that the bookseller knew of the presence of the obscene book the
Court felt that he would resort to selective stocking of books and thereby
possibly eliminate constitutionally protected material from the access of
the reading public." Without scienter the ordinance was considered un-
constitutional as an encroachment upon the First Amendment beyond per-
missable limits.'
Justices Harlan and Stewart applied the reasoning of the Smith de-
cision to the instant case. They felt that the fear of loss of an issue of a
periodical by removal without a showing of knowledge on the part of the
publisher will give rise to self-censorship. The publishers may resort to
selective publication of advertisements in order to be certain that the Post
Office Department will not remove their magazines from the mail. This
"... would deprive such material, which might otherwise be entitled to
constitutional protection, of a legitimate and recognized avenue of access
to the public.' "" Hence, the prior restraint is limited to situations where
scienter can be attached to the publisher.
Scienter is an immaterial element to the mechanism of a prior restraint.
'Poss v. Christenberry, 179 F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See, PAUL & SCHWARTZ,
FEDERAL CENSORSHII-OBscENITY IN THE MAILS, 303 (1962).
"On a number of occasions the police had seized hard-core photographs in the pos-
session of the third-party advertisers.1a361 U.S. 147 (1959).
"'"... (I)f the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents
* . .he will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus
the State will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally
protected as well as obscene literature." Id. at 153.
'6"Doubtless any form of criminal obscenity statute . . .will induce some tendency
to self-censorship and have some inhibitory effect on the dissemination of material
not obscene. .. ." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959). And Mr. Justice
Frankfurther concurring in that case notes: "Such difficulties or hazards are in-
herent in many domains of the law...." Smith v. California, supra at 164.
"Instant case at 1440.
[Vol. 24,
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In the dissent in the instant case, Mr. Justice Clark wrote: "The sender's
knowledge of the matter sought to be mailed is immaterial to the harm
caused to the public by its dissemination."' Knowledge and other mental
elements are not relevant in determining whether the magazines should be
removed from the mails. The nature of a prior restraint does not contem-
plate relief from suppression on the grounds that the publisher (or com-
municator) does not know that his publication contains the particular thing
which is sought to be suppressed. The important inquiry is whether the
particular evil is so grave or detrimental that restraint on its presentation
to the public is necessary. This is demonstrated by Chaffee's classic ex-
a.mple of the publication of the sailing dates of American troops into a war
sector.' The fact that the publisher had no knowledge that the publication
contained such information would hardly justify its dissemination.
The restriction on freedom of self-expression has been limited to in-
stances where treason, sedition, or obscenity is involved.' In these situa-
tions the evil to the public overrides the First Amendment guarantees of
freedom of speech and press. If material which contains information of
where obscenity may be obtained is sufficiently evil to warrant a prior re-
straint then the execution of the restraint ought not to be crippled by the
requirement of proof of scienter.
Another objection to requiring scienter is that it is foreign to the pro-
cedure employed' in exercising a prior restraint. Prior to the instant case,
the only concern of the Post Office Department was whether the magazines
appeared to be obscene or whether they contained information of where
obscenity could be obtained. This was a "yes" or "no " situation and the
controversy concerned only the issue of obscenity. The presentation of the
evidence went to support or deny the charge that the materials were ob-
scene in themselves' or, in the alternative, whether they contained informa-
tion of where obscenity may be obtained.
"Instant case at 1457.
'SCHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (1941).
'2Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
'
3The procedure in substance is as follows: when a postmaster is in doubt as to
whether matter entered for mailing is mailable or not because of possible obscenity,
he withholds it and delivers a sample or statement of the facts to the Mailability
Division, Office of the General Counsel for the Post Office Department, Washing-
ton, D.C. The General Counsel either files a complaint or returns the matter for
admission to the mails. Within tea days of the filing of the complaint notice is
given and there is a hearing. The mailer may file an answer. At the hearing, the
Hearing Examiner makes a decision at the close of the evidence and argument.
After this initial decision, there may be an appeal to the Judicial Officer, which is
to be held within five days. The Judicial Officer renders a Departmental decision
or refers the matter directly to the Postmaster General. This is the end of the
administrative proceedings, but usually by this time the mailer has brought an
action in a federal district court for an injunction to enjoin the barring of the mat-
ter. 39 C.F.R., Part 203 (1959).
"'The Post Office Department claims a special expertise on the issue of obscenity,
and on this basis judicial review of obscenity determinations is resisted. It is felt
that the Post Office Department has a competence in the field of their specialty
that the judiciary cannot claim. Currently, however, this has been challenged.
"In the area of obscenity, however, this [expertise] is not true. The administrators,
to begin with, are not specialties. They are lawyers or party managers or, occa-
sionally, old postal hands whose work had probably had nothing whatever to do
with literature, history, psychology, and the other disciplines that may bear upon
intelligent consorship. Nor does their main work after appointment provide them
with pertinent experience or Information. In this respect they differ from many
1962]
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Now, in addition, scienter must be shown. Removal is certain to con-
tinue and abuse will result from the procedure as it now exists. The local
postmaster will not know whether the publisher has knowledge of the fact
that the magazines sought to be admitted contain information of where
obscenity may be obtained. Neither is there any way to assure that the
postal officials will affirm the restraint on an adequate finding of knowl-
edge at the administrative hearing. There is no jury,' and the first oppor-
tunity for judicial review is when the publisher files suit for injunction
or exhausts the administrative channels and appeals the final administra-
tive order.
In a criminal proceeding, such as the Smith case,' a jury is mandatory
for the determination of knowledge and the other mental elements. But
this is altogether different than leaving the determination to the local post-
master in the first instance and then to a hearing procedure where no jury
is provided and the proof of scienter must live or die on the finding of the
administrative official. This goes to the fundamental notions of fair and
full hearing. The analogy to the Smith case was poorly drawn on this
account.
When a monthly periodical is involved, the effect of the prior restraint
will be felt even if the publisher is found to be ignorant of the character
of his advertiser's products. The hearing is to be commenced within ten
days,' but there is no provision for a speedy determination. The clumsi-
ness of attempting to determine whether the publisher had knowledge may
prolong the hearing for several days, and a prior restraint on communica-
tion with the public will have been exercise.
It is submitted that Justices Harlan and Stewart should have recog-
nized in their decision the fact that § 1461 is a prior restraint. The sub-
ject matter is proper for regulation, and the only question is on the pro-
cedural aspect. No cases indicate that material which advertises sources
of obscenity is of such urgency that a prior restraint of it is valid-with
or without scienter. The opinion announcing the judgment of the Court
reflects a disfavor of the advertising proscription as a prior restraint in-
asmuch as if is deemed necessary to require that knowledge be shown.
The question of whether the proscription ought to be sustained as a valid
prior restraint should have been decided. By attempting to reduce the
other administrators who, though not especially trained at the outset of their
careers, become educated through being immersed in their agency's practical affairs.
Moreover, the 'fact' of obscenity is so illusory that bureaucratic methods are not
peculiarly fitted to ascertain its existence. Especially when that 'fact' may limit
freedom of expression and may subject the press to a degree of governmental dicta-
tion, its existence should be verified by an independent examination." GELLHORN,
INDIvIDUAL FaREDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRANTs 95-96 (1958).
nThere is a movement to relocate the determination of obscenity to a court in the
first instance. Comment, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 354 (1960). See, Mr. Justice Bren-
nan's dissenting opinion in Kingsley Book Co. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
2Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
"Supra note 21.
[Vol. 24,
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practice of self-censorship,' the possibility of depriving a publisher and
the public of the right to communicate without prior restraint has not been
eliminated.
JOHN J. TOYNSEN, JR.
PUNAT1VE DAMAGES FoR TIE FRAUDULENT PROCUREMENT Op A RE-
LEASE ARE PROH1BITED By STATUTE.-Plaintiff purchased a used auto-
mobile for $495. As a downpayment he was allowed *200 for a 1937 truck
and a 1949 automobile. The balance was financed by a conditional sales con-
tract, which was assigned to a finance company. As part of the same trans-
action the conditional sales vendor purchased a dual-interest insurance
policy from the defendant company. This policy provided that in the event
of a collision or upset, the plaintiff and the finance company, as their in-
terests might appear, would receive the actual cash value of the automobile
at the time of the loss, less $50. Ten days after the purchase plaintiff was
involved in an accident. At that time $330 was owing to the finance com-
pany. Upon notification of the accident, the defendant's adjuster con-
ducted an investigation and submitted a report to the defendant company
ascertaining the total loss to the insured to be $330. Subsequently a re-
lease was submitted to the plaintiff for his signature. By the provisions of
the release the plaintiff, in consideration of payment of $330 to the finance
company, discharged the defendant from further liability. Although the
plaintiff read this instrument, the jury found that he executed it in re-
liance on the representation made to him by the defendant's adjuster that
there would be "something" left over for him, either the interest in the
policy or another car. The finance company received $330, and the plain-
tiff $9.81 representing hte unearned premiums of the policy. Plaintiff,
contending that he did not receive the "something" promised him by the
adjuster, brought this action proceeding on a tort theory based on fraud.
The jury awarded him $115 compensatory damages and $750 punative
2'The end result of the proceeding will possibly be a greater threat of self-censorship
practice than before. The fear that causes self-censorship is still a delay with con-
sequential financial loss, but it is magnified by subjecting the publisher to a hear-
ing where suspicious circumstances will be paraded before the Hearing Examiner in
an effort to show that he had knowledge. This is not considered by the majority
in the instant case.
It Is reasonable to suppose that this publisher or any similar publisher does not
really fear economic loss with ultimate deprivation of constitutionally protected
advertising. The magazines are designed for homosexuals and are sold to them to
the extent of the precise limits tolerated by our obscenity law. This should provide
a basis for finding scienter from the circumstances. In the Smith case the Court
recognized that personal knowledge is not necessary and that circumstantial knowl-
edge would satisfy the requirement. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959).
Here, however, Justices Harlan and Stewart would not find scienter satisfied
by the circumstances. 'This is not in keeping with the modern trend advocated by
Paul and Schwartz. They would root the test for obscenity in a study of commercial
exploitation and conduct of the individuals. Looking to the circumstances would
force the conduct of the individual into the foreground, and a new, more effective
basis for determining obscenity would be provided. PAUL & ScHwARTZ, FEDERAL CEN-
SOPSHIP-OBScENITY IN THE MArLs 214 (1962). See dissenting opinions of Mr.
Chief Justice Warren in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) and Kingsley
Book Co. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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